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International Private Law, Consumers and the Net.
A confusing maze or a smooth path towards a Single European Market?
Charlotte Waelde
Trade across borders was once largely confined to transactions as between businesses.  
Commercial links could be forged and exploited in the international market place 
where disputes would be settled by reference to carefully crafted rules rooted in legal 
theory1 used inter alia to decide which courts should have jurisdiction to hear a 
dispute and which law should be applied.  
Further the parties, generally well advised, could look after their own interests.  As 
part of a risk management strategy contractual terms could stipulate the extent of the 
risk to be borne by each party, and in the event of a dispute could dictate the forum in 
which that dispute would be heard and the law that would be applied.  Only the 
unwary or ill advised would need to fall upon the broad back of the general law.  The 
precedents set by those disputes could, in turn, be used to shape future behaviour.  
And so international trade flourished – between businesses.  Seldom would a 
consumer step outside the confines of her home shores to make a purchase from 
another territory.  If she did, it was generally small.  Perhaps a trophy brought back 
from a holiday in the sun, or a memento for a partner when returning from a business 
trip.
However with the Internet revolution that, at least in relation to consumers, has 
changed.  Now the international sourcing of goods and services is not confined to the 
larger commercial interest.  Rather, the development of the Internet has meant that 
anyone can get involved in buying and selling across borders, and that includes small 
suppliers and consumers.  Within Europe statistics suggest that the majority of e-
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commerce transactions take place as between businesses (B2B).2  By contrast, by far 
the most legislative initiatives have been designed to regulate the business to 
consumer (B2C) marketplace.3  It is in this sector that debate has been fierce over two 
regulatory paradigms:  country of origin versus country of destination.  
Roughly translated the country of origin principle can be understood to mean that a 
business can carry with it wherever it trades its own home country regulation and law.  
Conversely the country of destination principle means that the law and regulation of 
the country where goods or services are received apply to a transaction.  
Illustration:
If a supplier of Sancerre in France sold wine to a consumer based in Scotland, country 
of origin regulation would mean that it would be French rules that applied:  in other 
words, the rules of the place of the supplier.  Conversely, country of destination 
regulation would mean that it would be the rules of the UK that applied:  the rules of 
the place of the consumer.4
It is country of origin regulation that has, in principle, been chosen for incorporation 
into the E-commerce Directive5 and logically into the UK Regulations implementing 
that Directive.6  
Clearly such a rule is highly advantageous for a business which needs only to be 
appraised of one set of rules that will be applicable to its activities.  Those in charge 
of the business can trade in the confident knowledge that so long as they comply with 
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(Directive on electronic commerce) (the E-commerce Directive).
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the regulations of their own domestic system, those are the standards by which they 
will be judged, no matter the recipient country.
But as ever, matters are not so simple, particularly in the context of consumer 
contracts.  There is a derogation from the country of origin principle in the E-
commerce Directive specifically for consumer contracts which would seem to apply a 
country of destination approach through the application of the general rules of 
international private law, in particular the Brussels Regulation dealing with 
jurisdiction,7 and the Rome Convention dealing with choice of law.8  However, it 
would seem to be unsettled as to which elements of the relationship between the 
supplier and consumer are subject to the country of destination principle, and which to 
the country of origin approach.  As will be argued in this paper, the result, in the 
context of consumer contracts, might be considered a confusing maze rather than 
providing a smooth path to the single European market.
To explain the debate this article will first examine the genesis of the country of 
origin approach to regulation and explain how it has operated in the broadcasting 
sector in Europe.  In the ensuing discussion on the E-commerce Directive and the UK 
Regulations implementing the Directive the focus will be on two arguments that have 
accompanied these instruments.  The first is the debate as to the meaning of the 
country of origin principle, and the second is as to the scope of the derogation 
concerning consumers.  The discussion will move to the Rome Convention and the 
Brussels Regulation analysing the rules on choice of law and jurisdiction in those 
instruments.  Finally the question will be asked as to whether all the hiatus in this area 
really matters anyway particularly given that a consumer is unlikely to use court 
procedures in respect of transactions that may have little financial value.  There are 
alternative mechanisms by which the consumer may protect herself in the e-
commerce marketplace.  Throughout this paper the discussion will be limited to 
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consumer contracts that are effected between a supplier and a consumer located 
within different countries in the EU.9
Terminology:  country of origin and country of destination
Within the EU the country of origin principle first appeared in the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive.10 That Directive (as amended11) establishes a legal framework for 
the free movement of television broadcasting services in the EU to promote the 
development of a European market in broadcasting and related activities such as 
television advertising and the production of audiovisual programmes. It does this by 
seeking to ensure that only one Member State has competence to regulate activities 
within the fields co-ordinated by the Directive12, the intention being to ensure the 
freedom to provide services throughout the EU without being subject to possibly 
contradictory regulatory regimes.  The Directives make it clear under which Member 
State's jurisdiction television broadcasters fall.  This question is determined mainly by 
reference to where their central administration is located and where management 
decisions concerning programming are taken.13
However, the country of origin principle is not absolute and can give way to country 
of destination influence in certain circumstances.  This can be seen in
Konsumentenombudsmannen v. Agostini Förlag and TV-Shop i Sverige14 a case which 
concerned inter alia the re-transmission of broadcasts into Sweden, Norway and 
                                                
9 Different rules apply where either the consumer or supplier are outwith the EU and also as between 
domiciliaries within the UK.  For the UK implementing provisions see Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 as amended e.g. Schedule 4 for intra UK disputes and Schedule 8 for Scottish and 
non-EU disputes.  
10 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities 
11 Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities.  
The Directives are currently under review with many broadcasters commenting favourably on the 
operation of the country of origin rule and expressing the view that the rule should not be changed.  See 
generally http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/index_en.htm.
12 Article 3 of Directive 89/552/EEC.
13 The ECJ has made it clear that a Member State cannot object to the re-transmission on its territory of 
programmes broadcast by a television broadcaster body within the jurisdiction of another Member 
State where it considers that the programmes of the latter State do not meet requirements of article 4 
and 5 of the Directive, since this is a matter the assessment of which is within the field of control of the 
State of origin Judgement of 29 May 1997  Preliminary Decision - Paul Denuit v. Kingdom of Belgium 
C-14/96
14 Judgement of 9 July 1997 C-34, C-35, C-36/95.
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Denmark from the UK.  These broadcasts contained advertisements that were lawful 
in the country of origin (the UK) but contrary to the Swedish law on Marketing 
Practices15 (the country of destination).  The question arose as to whether the Swedish 
authorities could exercise any control over the content of these advertisements.  The 
ECJ held that the Directive does not in principle preclude application of national rules 
with the general aim of consumer protection provided that does not involve secondary 
control of television broadcasts in addition to the control which the broadcasting 
Member State must carry out.16   In other words, the Swedish authorities were able to 
exercise some control over the content of the advertisements in accordance with their 
domestic law, but that control only took effect after the re-broadcast had been 
transmitted and could not prevent transmission of the broadcast itself.17
So from this it seems that although the TV Without Frontiers Directive posits as a 
general rule country of origin regulation, it is not absolute.  It does not preclude the 
authorities in the country of destination exercising regulatory oversight and as a result 
no-doubt influencing the behaviour of the advertisers.  As will be seen in the 
discussion on the E-commerce Directive not only does the meaning of the country of 
origin paradigm seem to have troubled commentators possibly more so than with the 
TV Without Frontiers Directive, but in addition, and in common with the broadcasting 
sector, the scope of the rule remains unclear.
The E-commerce directive and the ‘fudge’ on questions of applicable law.
Arguments have raged as to the meaning of the country of origin rule to be found in 
the E-commerce Directive.18  Three suggestions have been made as to the 
interpretation of the rule:
                                                
15 Article 2 of the Swedish Marknadsföringslag (1975:1418) 
16 fn. 13 Para 38.
17 The ECJ noted in particular that that Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to 
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17), which provides in particular in Article 4(1) 
that Member States are to ensure that adequate and effective means exist for the control of misleading 
advertising in the interests of consumers as well as competitors and the general public, could be robbed 
of its substance in the field of television advertising if the receiving Member State were deprived of all 
possibility of adopting measures against an advertiser and that this would be in contradiction with the 
express intention of the Community legislature. Para 37.
18 E-commerce Directive Article 3.1.
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1. the rule amounts to an additional rule on international private law by 
designating the applicable law;
2. the rule means that the conflicts laws of the country of establishment of the 
service provider (ISSP) determine which law applies to any particular dispute;
3. the rule only concerns the substantive law (after the conflict laws have been 
applied normally) and prohibits the application of stricter rules than those of 
the country of origin (the restrictions test).19
In laying out the country of origin principle, Recital 22 of the E-commerce Directive 
provides that ‘Information society services should be supervised at the source of the 
activity…such information society services should in principle be subject to the law of 
the member state in which the service provider is established’, and Article 3, the 
Internal Market measure, provides ‘Each Member State shall ensure that the 
information society services provided by a service provider established on its territory 
comply with the national provisions applicable in the Member State in question which 
fall within the coordinated field.’
Suggestion 1:  the rule amounts to an additional rule on international private law by 
designating the applicable law;
Under this suggestion and in order to determine whose law applies to a certain set of 
facts it would be necessary to look at where the information society service provider20
(ISSP) (in the example given above, the supplier of Sancerre) is established21 and 
apply that law as the applicable law (so long as the activity under question falls within 
                                                
19 Note Hellner, M ‘The Country of Origin Principle in the E-commerce Directive – A Conflict with 
Conflict of Laws?’ European Review of Private Law 12 (2): 193-213, 2004 who argues that there are 
three ways in which the country of origin principle could be understood: (i) as a choice of law rule for 
the law applicable to e-commerce services; (ii) as only setting out certain limitations to the application 
of the designated law; (iii) as making the rules of the home country of the service provider 
internationally mandatory and thus applicable irrespective of what law is applicable to the contract or 
tort.
20 ‘Information society services’  are defined as services within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 
98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC and a ‘service provider’ as any natural or legal person 
providing an information society service.  E-commerce Directive Article 2.
21 An ‘established service provider’ is defined as a service provider who effectively pursues an 
economic activity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. The presence and use of the 
technical means and technologies required do not, in themselves, constitute an establishment of the 
provider.  E-commerce Directive Article 2.  
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the co-ordinated field22).  In other words, the country of origin rule is a choice of law 
rule and as such prevents conflict of laws questions arising by subjecting an ISSP to 
the law of its establishment.  This analysis would be consistent with Recital 55 and 
Article  3.3 referring to the derogations from the internal market clause.  Recital 55 
provides that the Directive does not affect the law applicable to contractual 
obligations relating to consumer contracts;  Article  3.3 specifically dis-applies the 
internal market article to those fields specified in the Annex.  Included within those 
fields are contractual obligations concerning consumer contracts.  It can be argued 
that these specific derogations are necessary because the country of origin rule is a 
choice of law clause.  If that were not so, what would be the point of including these 
derogations in the Directive?  Thus one interpretation is that the country of origin rule 
is a choice of law rule which can be derogated from in the limited circumstances set 
out in the Annex to the Directive.  
But this interpretation takes no account of the first sentence of Recital 2323 and Article 
1.4 of the Directive, the latter of which states that ‘This Directive does not establish 
additional rules on private international law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of 
Courts’.  It is this measure that has caused much uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
country of origin rule.  It is arguable that by interpreting the country of origin 
provision as a rule designating the applicable law, that amounts to an additional rule 
of international private law.  
Suggestion 2: the rule means that the conflicts laws of the country of establishment of 
the service provider (ISSP) determine which law applies to any particular dispute;
                                                
22 The coordinated field concerns requirements with which the service provider has to comply in 
respect of: (i) the taking up of the activity of an information society service, such as requirements 
concerning information society service; qualifications, authorisation or notification,  the pursuit of the 
activity of an information society service, such as requirements concerning the behaviour of the service 
provider, including those applicable to advertising and contracts, or requirements concerning the 
liability of the service provider;  (ii) The coordinated field does not cover requirements applicable to 
goods as such, requirements applicable to the delivery of goods, requirements applicable to services 
not provided by electronic means.
23 Recital 23 states This Directive neither aims to establish additional rules on private international 
law relating to conflicts of law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of Courts; provisions of the 
applicable law designated by rules of international law must not restrict the freedom to provide 
services established in this Directive.  E-commerce Directive Article 2.
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The second suggestion is to interpret the country of origin rule as designating a 
particular legal system.  If that is the case, analysis might proceed as follows.  The 
first step would be to look at the establishment of the ISSP (the supplier of Sancerre) 
– in other words the country of origin.  This explains the importance of the country of 
origin rule.  However, the second step would be to apply the conflict laws of that 
country to determine which law applies to any particular dispute. In other words, the 
country of origin rule merely points to a particular legal system as a first step in the 
process.  The conflict rules of that legal system should then be considered to 
determine which law should be applied.  
Suggestion 3:  the rule only concerns the substantive law (after the conflict laws have 
been applied normally) and prohibits the application of stricter rules than those of the 
country of origin (the ‘restrictions test’).
The third suggestion leads on from application of the second, but tries to take into 
account the wording of the second sentence in Recital 23: ‘ provisions of the 
applicable law designated by rules of private international law must not restrict the 
freedom to provide information society services as established in this Directive’ and 
of Article 3.2 ‘Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated 
field, restrict the freedom to provide information society services from another 
Member State.’  This has been called by some the ‘restrictions test’.  Broadly it means 
that if application of the applicable law (chosen after the application of the relevant 
conflict laws) turns out to be more strict than the law of the ISSP, that would result in 
a restriction on the ability to provide information society services. Therefore the more 
strict law  cannot be applied because it would ‘restrict the freedom to provide 
information society services’.  
Illustration:
Under the first option, if a French supplier supplied bottles of Sancerre to a Scottish 
retailer and the country of origin rule designated a particular law (i.e. that of the 
country of origin) to be applied in the event of a dispute, then French law would apply 
to that particular problem.  Under the second option, where the county of origin rule 
designated a particular legal system (that of the establishment of the ISSP – the 
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supplier of Sancerre), then French conflict of laws rules would be applied to 
determine which law should be applied to that dispute.  That, in turn, may or may not 
be French law.  Leading on from that and under the third option, French conflicts 
rules would determine which law was applied, (e.g. British law), but that law could 
only be applied if it was no more strict than the law of the country of origin – French 
law.
It is easy to see how complex arguments could become in deciding the applicable law 
to be applied to any dispute.24  Suffice it to say, academic argument in respect of these 
differing interpretations might have quietened, but it has not gone away.  Attention 
has now shifted as to how these measures have been incorporated into implementing 
Regulations in the Member States.  It is as to the decisions taken in the UK that we 
now turn.  
UK Implementing Regulations
In the first draft of the implementing regulations, the UK Government included a 
slightly modified version of the internal market clause25 and also sought to transpose 
Article 1.4 of the directive almost verbatim.26  In other words, this same tension 
relating to the meaning of the country of origin principle in juxtaposition with the text 
stating that no new rules on international private law were established remained.  The 
Government anticipated that that the effect of this was that ‘UK courts will continue 
to follow the requirements of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 but that the application of the law dictated by them would be 
subject to a restrictions test in accordance with the internal market provisions of the 
Regulations.’27
Needless to say many commentators who responded to the consultation document 
rehearsed the points made in the last section of this paper and stressed the uncertainty 
                                                
24 For a proposal for a convention on the liability of online information publishers see Reed ‘Liability 
of Online Information Providers – Towards a Global Solution’,  2003 International Review of Law 
Computers & Technology Vol 17/3  pp. 255-265.
25 Clause 7 Draft Regulations at http://www.dti.gov.uk/industry_files/pdf/regulations.pdf
26 Clause 5 of the Draft Regulations http://www.dti.gov.uk/industry_files/pdf/regulations.pdf
27 Guide for Business to the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2001.  Interim Guidance  
Para 3.6. Available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/industry_files/pdf/guidance.pdf
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that taking this course of action would result in for ISSPs who would be unsure of 
precisely which rule applied.  The uncertainty would be likely to remain until such 
time as the ECJ has had the opportunity to resolve the conflict.  Bowing to pressure, 
the Government removed the international private law clause (clause 5) from the final 
version of the Regulations saying not only that ‘On balance, [the Government] agrees 
that the country of origin regulation should take precedence and has removed the 
provision on private international law accordingly’28, but also that ‘The Government 
has … looked to the purpose of the Directive in informing its approach. This is 
expressed in Article 1(1) as “ensuring the free movement of information society 
services between the Member States” and qualified by the statement in recital 22 that 
“such information society services should in principle be subject to the law of the 
Member State in which the service provider is established”. Taken together, 
Regulations 4(1) to 4(3) will, if replicated by other Member States, provide for what 
might be termed country-of-origin regulation’.29  Whether the Government’s 
optimism is overstated remains to be seen.  
So in the Regulations as implemented, the internal market clause provides (with 
certain exclusions30) that:
 any requirement that falls within the co-ordinated field will apply to the 
provision of an information society service by a service provider established in 
the UK irrespective of whether the information society service is provided in 
the UK or another Member State;31
 enforcement authorities are required to ensure compliance with that 
requirement;32
 any requirement falling within the co-ordinated field is not to be applied to the 
provision of an information society service by a service provider established in 
a member State other than the UK.33   
                                                
28 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, Public Consultation – Government 
Response 2002
29 Guide for Business to the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Para 4.8 
30 Regulation 4:  Those activities excluded from this provision are set out in the Annex to the Directive 





This is complex wording which would seem to fall short of what many may have 
wanted to see in the Regulations – a clear statement that ISSPs established in the UK 
must comply with UK law for their activities that fall within the co-ordinated field.34
One assumes from the optimistic statements made by the Government repeated above, 
that it is the Government’s view that country of origin rule as it has been implemented 
in the Regulations means just that:  that (subject to the discussion below) it will be the 
law of the place of the establishment of the service provider that applies to activities 
within the co-ordinated field.
The derogation for consumers
Having come this far as to establish, in terms of the UK implementing Regulations, 
that it is (arguably) the ‘home law’ of the ISSP that takes precedence, it has to be 
appreciated that this is not absolute.  Not only can UK based enforcement authorities 
take action against ISSPs where necessary for the protection of consumers35 but in 
addition, and following protracted argument about the protection of consumers who 
engage in e-commerce, contractual obligations concerning consumers36 are exempt in 
both the Directive37 and the UK implementing Regulations.38  This should mean that 
it is the law of the consumers’ habitual residence that applies to contractual 
obligations concerning consumer contracts.39  But that of course begs the question as 
to what a contractual obligation concerning a consumer contract is.  
The suppliers and the consumers:  poles apart
There has been a bitterly contested war of words between suppliers and consumers as 
to whether the E-commerce Directive should reflect the country of origin or the 
                                                
34 As has been implemented in some other countries eg. Luxembourg  Article 2.4. of their law states 
‘The legislation of the place of business of the information society service provider shall be applicable 
to providers and the services they provide, without prejudice to the freedom of the parties to choose the 
law applicable to their contract.’  Law available at http://www.etat.lu/memorial/T01_a/tablealp.html
Austria Part 6, § 20(1) ‘In the co-ordinated field (§ 3(8)), the legal requirements for a service provider 
established in a Member State shall be determined in accordance with the law of such state’.   Law 
available at http://www.bgbl.at/CIC/BASIS/bgblpdf/www/pdf/DDD/2001a15201 
35 E-commerce Directive Article 3(4)(1).Regulations 5 (1)(d)
36 E-commerce Directive Article 2(e). Regulations 2 ‘consumer means any natural person who is 
acting for purposes other than those of his trade, business or profession’.
37 Recitals 55, 56. Article 3(3) and Annex
38 Regulation 4(4) and Annex
39 Recital 55.  For the reason why see the section below on the EC Convention of the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980) (Rome Convention).
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country of destination approach to regulation in the field of consumer contracts.40  
These opposing views can be simply stated.  The suppliers argue that if they are to 
engage in B2C e-commerce, then they must be able to do so within an environment 
that not only promotes certainty in legal dealings but does so in a manner in which 
legal and business risks are both known and capable of management.  The application 
of country of destination rule that might result in a supplier being sued by a consumer 
in the courts of the consumers’ domicile and thus exposing the supplier to the 
potential of being sued in each and any one of the Member States of the EU, is an 
unmanageable risk.  Equally, rules on choice of law that require a supplier to trade in 
accordance with the consumer protection laws in each of the Member States of the 
EU, and potentially liable if he does not, are unreasonable and unworkable both in 
terms of knowledge of the rules and in terms of cost for compliance.  As a result the 
supplier will not engage in e-commerce across borders and the Single European 
Market will not become a reality.
Unsurprisingly, consumers (or rather their representatives) hold the opposite view.  
Consumers argue that they must both be able to sue in the courts of their home 
country, and that the consumer protection laws of their country should apply to a 
cross border transaction.  Any other rule, and in particular the country of origin rule 
applying the laws of the supplier to a consumer transaction and requiring the 
consumer to sue in the courts of the suppliers domicile, would effectively deny the 
consumer access to justice.  A consumer does not have the financial means to pursue a 
trader in the traders’ home country, nor knowledge of the traders’ laws.  Any 
transaction in which the consumer engages is likely to be of (relatively) small value, 
and thus not worth pursing across borders.  If a consumer cannot sue a supplier in her 
home courts using her own familiar laws then she will not engage in e-commerce 
across borders and the Single European Market will not become a reality. 
Consumer protection in the Directive and the implementing Regulations  
The Directive makes it clear that the scope of the co-ordinated field reaches into 
‘requirements relating to on-line activities such as on-line information, on-line 
                                                
40 This dichotomy was also one that bedevilled the negotiations surrounding the revision of the 
Brussels Convention.  See generally ‘Hearing on electronic commerce Jurisdiction and applicable law 
4-5 November 1999. Position papers submitted to the European Commission’.  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/scic/conferences/991104/contributions.pdf
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advertising, on-line shopping, and on-line contracting’ but that it does not cover 
‘legal requirements relating to goods such as safety standards, labelling obligations 
or liability for goods’.41  Further, consumer contracts ‘should be interpreted as 
including information on the essential elements of the content of the contract, 
including consumer rights, which have a determining influence on the decision to 
contract’.42  Does this include pre-contractual matters such as advertisements?  
Contractual matters as embodied in the agreement between the parties and relating to 
such measures as the quantity and description of the goods (ten bottles of Sancerre 
1999)?  Does it also encompass implied terms, such as the quality of the goods?  
Certainly it would appear that public law regulations relating to the process of 
manufacture are outwith the scope of the measures.  But what lies within is far less 
certain.
When the UK Government was implementing these obligations the first approach was 
to transpose the text of the derogation in the Directive verbatim into the Schedule to 
the Regulations.43  However, the advice given in the interim Guide to Business44 went 
on to elaborate on what might be covered, and in doing so appears to have drawn on 
the Recitals laid out above.  In this the Government interpreted the derogation as 
applying to: 
 the question of which law is applicable to the substance of a dispute, including 
contractual obligations/rights; 
 essential information that has a determining influence on the decision to 
contract, which must be provided in accordance with the requirements of the 
consumer’s Member State; 
 requirements applicable to such contractual obligations, including 
requirements to do certain things before entering into a contract (e.g. provide 
information about cancellation rights under the provisions of timeshare 
legislation).
                                                
41 Recital 21 Article 2 (ii) Regulations 2
42 Recital 56
43 Schedule to the Draft Regulations at http://www2.dti.gov.uk/industry_files/pdf/regulations.pdf
44 Fn 25 above
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Once again there was some disquiet from a number of commentators who considered 
that the extent of these derogations from the country of origin principle were 
excessive in that they extended both to pre- contractual measures as well as to the 
terms of the contract.  This, it was argued, was not warranted in terms of the 
Directive.  In particular it was argued that as most B2C commerce involves some sort 
of contract, if pre-contractual measures were included within the scope of the 
derogation, the derogation would swallow the rule.  Having listened to the discussion, 
the Government clearly had sympathy for that argument.  Whereas the wording of the 
final Guide to Business remains the same,45 that wording differs from the Government 
response to the consultation which suggests that the derogation will apply to:
 the law applicable to the substance of a dispute, including contractual
obligations/rights, 
 information provided by traders about consumers’ rights; 
 other essential information that has a determining influence on the decision to 
contract. 
 laws that bear on the terms of the contract (e.g. rules on implied terms, certain 
cancellation rights and the circumstances in which an agreement is 
unenforceable).
It would appear that the scope of the advice is narrower than the wording in the 
Guide.  For instance there is no reference to ‘essential information having a 
determining influence on the decision to contract being supplied in accordance with 
the consumers’ Member State’.  Certainly the words ‘other essential information’
remain but there is no reference to the consumers’ Member State.   In addition the 
wording ‘including the requirement to do certain things before entering into a 
contract’ has been removed even if the obligation to provide information in relation to 
cancellation rights remains albeit  narrowed to ‘certain cancellation rights’ (emphasis 
added).
Despite this, the scope of the derogation remains unclear. 
                                                
45 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, Public Consultation – Government 
Response 2002.
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The Rome Convention and the applicable law
As the Directive and Regulations would appear to point to the consumers country to 
determine the applicable law for contractual obligations concerning consumer 
contracts (subject to the discussion above), this section will analyse the relevance of 
the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations 1980 (the 
Rome Convention) which has been transposed into UK law by way of the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990 (as amended).  Both of these instruments deal with 
matters of applicable law.
The main principle in deciding the applicable law in the Rome Convention is that of 
freedom of choice.46  In other words, the parties are free to choose which law should
apply to their dealings.  However, special provisions apply to consumer contracts.47  
These are set out in Article 5.  These apply to a contract48  the object of which is the 
supply of goods or services to a consumer for a purpose which can be regarded as 
being outside his trade or profession.  In the absence of choice, the contract will be 
governed by the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence.  
However, if the parties have expressed the law that will govern the contract, that will 
not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the 
mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence.49  
Thus if there is no choice of law clause in the contract, it will be governed by the laws 
of the place where the consumer has his habitual residence.  However, if there is a 
choice of law clause which refers to something other than the law of the consumers 
habitual residence, then the law referred to in the choice of law clause will apply 
except to matters falling within the mandatory rules of the consumers habitual 
                                                
46 Rome Convention Article 3.1.
47 See Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Giuliano and 
Lagarde OJ No C 282; 31/10/1980 p. 23. Available at http://www.rome-
convention.org/instruments/i_rep_lagarde_en.htm
48 But not to a contract of carriage, except an inclusive tour contract providing for a combination of 
travel and accommodation, or a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied 
to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence.  Rome 
Convention Articles 5(4) and (5)
49 Rome Convention Article 5(2)
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residence.  Thus different parts of a consumer contract may be governed by the laws 
of two (or more) countries.50
Illustration
A Scottish consumer purchases Sancerre from a French supplier under a contract with 
a choice of law clause making French law applicable to the contract.  French law will 
govern but UK mandatory rules will apply in the realm of consumer protection.  
Two points arise from this.  First, the derogation only applies if one of the tests in 
Article 5(2) of the Rome Convention is met:
 in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific 
invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country 
all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract; or 
 the other party or his agent received the consumer’s order in that country; or 
 the contract was for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that 
country to another country and there gave his order, provided that the 
consumer’s journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the 
consumer to buy.51
Second, what is meant by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which the 
consumer has her habitual residence?
Specific Invitation and Advertising
Turning to the first point.  If the protective provisions are to apply for the benefit of 
the consumer, the contract must meet one of the conditions set out in Article 5(2).  Of 
particular note for e-commerce matters is the first indent.  What is meant by the 
contract being preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him and by advertising?  
What amounts to a specific invitation?  Would an e-mail from an e-tailer advertising a 
sale and sent to a distribution list (to those who had opted in for such 
                                                
50 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation.  Presented by the Commission 
Brussels 14.1.2003.  COM (2002) 654(01) final p 28.  
51 Rome Convention Article 5(1)(2).  
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communications52) amount to a specific invitation to each recipient?  Would the 
techniques used by e-tailers such as amazon.com whereby a web site is ‘personalised’ 
each time you visit it with details of products that have been identified as potentially 
suitable amount to a specific invitation?  Would (an intensely annoying) pop-up 
advertisement amount to a specific invitation?  And what about advertising?  A 
distinction is sometimes made between passive and active websites.  A passive 
website is generally seen as one which supplies information but does little more.  By 
contrast an active website is one with which the consumer can interact by, for 
example, ordering goods on line.53  Does the mere provision of a passive website 
amount to advertising?  In these circumstances a consumer has to take the initiative to 
find the website.  Is this not more akin to a consumer reaching out to the e-tailer, 
rather than the e-tailer advertising his wares to the consumer?  Is the test to be 
subjective; in other words, what appears to be the intention of the website owner 
assessed from the facts and circumstances?  Or is the test objective; in other words 
what is to be inferred from an objective assessment of the website and the surrounding 
circumstances?  
In the pre-Internet days, these questions may have resulted in relatively clear answers.  
For instance, the French supplier of Sancerre might have decided to target consumers 
in the South of England by way mail-shot, knowing the legal requirements of that 
system.  Or he might advertise in a newspaper with a circulation largely restricted to a 
similar territory.  In these circumstances it would seem clear that the criteria in the 
Article would be met.  The supplier would have taken active steps to enter the 
consumers’ state.  It is a lot less clear that the mere provision of a passive website 
would fulfil the criteria necessary to bring it within the protective provisions of 
                                                
52 See Chapter X (spam)
53 This is a concept that has been used notably in the States when considering questions of jurisdiction.  
See Zippo Manufacturing Company v Zippo Dot Com. Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (1997) At one end of the 
spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant 
enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated 
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. E.g. Compuserve, Inc. 
v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has 
simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. 
A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in 
it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction. E.g. Bensusan Restaurant Corp., v. King, 937 F. 
Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can 
exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined 
by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that 
occurs on the Web site. E.g. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.Mo. 1996).  See also 
Fn 79 below.
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Article 5(2).  The analysis might tend to point to the opposite conclusion – that the 
consumer had entered the territory of the supplier.  An analogy could perhaps be 
drawn with the UK cases of 800-Flowers Trade Mark54 and Euromarket Designs 
Market v Peters Ltd55, both cases concerning the question of whether a trade mark had 
been used in the UK.  Jacob J said that the content providers could not be said to have 
intended to reach the UK market:
‘the mere fact that websites can be accessed anywhere in the world does not mean… 
that the law should regard them as being used everywhere in the world.  It all 
depends on the circumstances, particularly the intention of the website owner and 
what the reader will understand if he accesses the site’.  
Jacob J seems to be suggesting that the test is an objective one:  what can be gleaned 
from an objective assessment of the intention of the website owner as evidenced by 
both the site and the surrounding circumstances.56 An objective assessment of a 
website provided by an e-tailer might take into account such matters as the language 
of the site, the currency, and perhaps whether disclaimers are used stating which 
territories the trader is prepared to supply.
Suffice it to say that it is not yet clear as to what type of on-line e-tailing activity 
might satisfy these criteria.  Some points may be clarified in due course as the 
European Commission is currently conducting a review of the Rome Convention 
suggesting inter alia that Convention should be converted into a Community 
Instrument and that the scope of the consumer protection measures might be revisited.  
Suggestions for reform include:  (a)  broadening those circumstances in which the 
mandatory consumer protection rules of the consumer’s habitual residence apply to a 
consumer contract provided the supplier is in a position to know where that is57; (b)  
systematic application of the law of the consumer’s place of residence58; (c)  bringing 
                                                
54 [2000] FSR 697, 705, confirmed on appeal [2001] EWCA Civ 721.
55 [2000] ETMR 1025, 1031.
56 For a much fuller discussion in the context of jurisdiction see Kohl, An Analytical Framework on 
Regulatory Competence over Online Activity p129 unpublished dissertation, University of Canberra 
2003.
57 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation.  Presented by the Commission
Brussels 14.1.2003.  COM (2002) 654(01) final p 28. (Green Paper)  Para 3.2.7.3. (iii).
58 ibid para 3.2.7.3 (v).
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the test into line with that to be found in the Brussels Regulation which refers to 
‘directing activity to’59 (see further the discussion below); and (d)  making the main 
rule the law of the consumers habitual residence and allowing derogation for the 
application of a limited number of other laws only in narrowly defined 
circumstances.60
The consultation period is currently underway.  It remains to be seen which test is
finally chosen although it is not hard to predict the views that will be expressed by the 
suppliers and the consumers, or that those views will diverge.   
Mandatory Rules 
The second main issue that arises from the discussion on the Rome Convention is that 
of mandatory rules.  It will be recalled from the discussion above that where the 
protective mechanism in Article 5 applies for the benefit of consumers, then the 
consumer is not to be deprived of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory 
rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence.  What are these 
mandatory rules?  The definition of mandatory rules is not easy, and different 
Member States offer differing interpretations.61  Very broadly mandatory rules can be 
considered to be those rules from which the parties cannot derogate by contract.62  
But that definition does not help deciding exactly which rules are mandatory in the 
context of consumer protection.  There seems to be no European, or even UK list of 
exactly which consumer protection laws would fall under this head.  In the Green 
Paper it is suggested that mandatory rules ‘involve[s] in particular the right of the 
consumer to withdraw from the contract and to be protected against unfair terms, 
                                                
59 ibid Para 3.2.7.3 (vi).
60 ibid Para 3.2.7.3 (viii).
61 For a discussion see Hellner, The country of origin principle in the E-commerce Directive:  A conflict 
with conflict of laws Riga Graduate School of Law Working Paper 2003 No. 6 p 21 et seq.
62 The mandatory provisions referred to in Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention are more deeply 
embedded than those relating to consumers in Article 5.  Article 7 mandatory rules (also called 
overriding rules) ‘are relevant only in an international context and involves provisions to which a state 
attaches such importance that it requires them to be applied whenever there is a connection between 
the legal situation and its territory, whatever law is otherwise applicable to the contract’.  Green Paper 
Para 3.2.8.1.  On mandatory rules see also e.g. M. Wojewoda, ‘Mandatory Rules in Private 
International Law:  With Special Reference to the Mandatory System under the Rome Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ 2000 7(2) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law pp 183-213.Cheshire & North Private International Law 13th ed. Butterworths, 
1999 p. 499.  Wadlow, Enforcement of Intellectual Property in European and International Law (1998) 
para 7-92.
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such as those releasing the professional from liability in the event of damage’.63  But 
this of course raises further questions.  Returning to the problem concerning the scope 
of the derogation from the country of origin rule for consumers outlined above,64  the 
question that now arises is as to within the scope of that derogation, which elements 
of the contractual relationship between supplier and consumer might qualify as 
mandatory rules? 
Illustration:
 A consumer in the UK contracts to purchase a case of Sancerre from a French 
supplier, but then wants to cancel the contract.  The UK has implemented the 
obligation in the Distancing Selling Directive to provide for 7 working days as a 
period in which the contract can be cancelled.65 But the French suppliers website 
states that the consumer has 10 working days during which the contract can be 
cancelled.66  Assuming that the cancellation period is within the scope of the 
derogation, is it also a mandatory rule?  If it is, then application of that rule would 
appear to require that the lesser cancellation term (the consumers’ mandatory rule) be 
applied.  That may be even if, for example, the cancellation period had a determining 
influence on the decision made by the consumer to enter into the contract.  In other 
words, the consumer might ultimately be prejudiced by the application of the 
consumers’ mandatory rules.
There appear to be no absolute answers to these difficult conundrums.  This is 
acknowledged in the Green Paper on the revision of the Rome Convention although 
perhaps the most useful suggestion made in that Paper to try and untangle some of the 
confusion is that ‘for legal matters already harmonised at Community level… the 
consumer protection rules of the law chosen by the parties should apply… Only in 
matters not harmonised at EC level, the consumer should not be deprived of the 
protection through the ‘mandatory rules’ of the law of the country of his habitual 
                                                
63 Green Paper p.28 fn 55.
64 See p X above
65 Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, SI 2000, No. 2334.  Working days means 
all days other than Saturdays, Sundays and Public Holidays.  Reg 11. the period begins on the day on 
which the contract is concluded and ends on the expiry of 7 working days beginning with the day after 
the day on which the consumer received the goods.
66 The French Code of Consumption requires 7 days from the day of the consumers order.  The period 
can be extended by one day when the 7 days would end on a public holiday.  Italian law provides for 
10 working days.  See www.retailing.org/ealaonline.pdf.
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residence’.   If the reader is looking for suggestions for a definitive list of what 
qualifies as a mandatory rule, she will be sorely disappointed.  
Brussels Regulation
So far the discussion in this paper has been on choice of law.  In this section questions 
of jurisdiction will be examined.  In other words, which courts have jurisdiction in the 
event of a dispute between a consumer and a supplier engaging in an e-commerce 
transaction.  The country of origin rule, being a conflicts of law rule, does not touch 
on matters of jurisdiction.  Therefore to determine matters of jurisdiction within 
Europe it is to the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Regulation and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters67 (the Brussels 
Regulation) to which we turn.68   
The main rule in the Brussels Regulation (implemented in the UK by way of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1990 as amended) is that the defendant should be 
sued in the State in which she is domiciled.69   This is supplemented by special rules 
for contracts,70 tort71 and for the protection of consumers.  The special rules 
determining jurisdiction in consumer contracts are to be found in Articles 13-15 of the 
Regulation.  
These rules permit consumers to bring proceedings against another party to the 
contract in either courts of the Contracting State in which that other party is domiciled 
                                                
67 Council Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
68 The Brussels Regulation replaced the Brussels Convention on 1 March 2002.   
For completeness it should be noted that negotiations are currently underway to amend Rome II which 
deals with the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.  As the Instrument goes beyond consumer 
contracts it will not be considered here.  For further details see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_ii/news_summary_rome2_en.ht
m
69 Brussels Regulation Article 2.
70 Brussels Regulation Article 5(1)(a). In relation to contractual jurisdiction the place of performance of 
the obligation in question is in relation to the sale of goods the place in a Member State where, under 
the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered, and in the case of the provision 
of services, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the services were provided or 
should have been provided. 
71 Brussels Regulation Article 5(3). This has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice to 
include both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it.  Case
68/93 Shevill v Presse Alliance [1995] 2 AC 18.   In Case 189/87 Kalfelis v. Schröder [1988] ECR 
5565 the ECJ rules on the scope of ‘matters relating to tort’, and in effect excluded any case in which 
the parties are in a contractual relationship.  This greatly reduces the relevance of this basis of 
jurisdiction in consumer cases.
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or in the courts of the state in which she (the consumer) is domiciled.72 Proceedings 
may only be brought against the consumer in the courts of the Contracting State in 
which the consumer is domiciled.73  In addition if the other party is not domiciled in a 
Contracting State but has a branch, agency or establishment in one state then as 
regards disputes arising out of the operation of that branch, agency or establishment 
the party shall be deemed to be domiciled in that state.74  The rules may only be 
derogated from in limited circumstances which favour the consumer.75
The consumer rules only apply in three types of situation. The first two apply where 
goods have been purchased with the assistance of credit and cover (i) contracts for the 
sale of goods on instalment credit terms76 and (ii) contracts for a loan repayable by 
instalments or any other form of credit made to finance the sale of goods.77
The third, and most important provision for these purposes, covers contracts other 
than those for credit purchase where: ‘the contract has been concluded with a person 
who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or 
to several States including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope 
of such activities’.78
The question is obviously raised of what ‘directs such activities to’ means in the 
context of consumer e-commerce?  Similar questions arise as those explored under the 
test of ‘advertising’ in relation to the Rome Convention.  Is the test subjective or is it 
objective?  If objective would that indicate that by the mere placing of the website on 
the Internet the supplier was directing activities at any consumer who cared to 
respond?  If the website is merely a passive one, giving information to the consumer 
                                                
72 Brussels Regulation Article 16(1).
73 Brussels Regulation Article 16(2).
74 Brussels Regulation Article 15(2).
75 Brussels Regulation Article 17. The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an 
agreement:1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or 2. which allows the consumer to 
bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section; or 3. which is entered into by the 
consumer and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the 
contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State, and which confers jurisdiction on 
the courts of that Member State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that 
Member State.
76 Brussels Regulation Article 15(1)(a)
77 Brussels Regulation Article 15(1)(b)
78 Brussels Regulation Article 15(1)(c)  
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but with little more can the supplier really be considered directing activity to the 
consumer?  Or would the supplier merely be seen as inviting the consumer into his 
store, wherever that might be situated?  What would be the position if only 
information about the products and services were made available on the site but that 
to enter into a contract a consumer was required to contact the trader by more 
conventional means, such as the telephone or by post? What if the supplier adds a 
facility to enable the consumer to make purchases using the website?  Does it matter 
what currency is used on the site?  Does it matter what language the site is in?  
Disclaimers and websites:  are they effective?
If the supplier felt he might be exposed to being sued in each and any of the member 
States of the EU he might feel that adding disclaimers specifying those jurisdictions in 
which he was prepared to do business, or perhaps more important, those in which he 
was not prepared to do business, might afford some protection.  Would such a 
disclaimer be effective (it would certainly appear to act against the creation of a single 
European market)?  During the passage of the E-commerce Directive through its 
legislative process in Europe, the European Parliament had proposed to take as one of 
the criteria concerning activities ‘directed to [at]79’ one or more member states, an 
attempt by an operator to confine its business to transactions with consumers 
domiciled in certain Member States.80  One of the ways in which this might have been 
done was through the use of disclaimers.  The amendment was not accepted by the 
Commission who opined:  ‘the existence of a consumer dispute requiring court action 
presupposes a consumer contract.  Yet the very existence of such a contract would 
seem to be a clear indication that the supplier of the goods or services has directed 
his activities towards the state where the consumer is domiciled’.81  It would appear 
that the Commission considers the scope of the protection accorded to consumers to 
be broad.  
                                                
79 The words ‘directed at’ were used in the previous draft.
80 See amended proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgements in civil and commercial matters COM (2000) 689 final p5
81 ibid p6
24
Other changes to the wording of the Directive made during the legislative process also 
show how problematic defining the scope of this test has been.82  A previous draft of 
the Regulation83 had provided that:
Account must be taken of the growing development of new communication 
technologies, particularly in relation to consumers; whereas, in particular, electronic 
commerce in goods or services by a means accessible in another Member Sates 
constitutes an activity directed to that State. Where that other State is the State of the 
consumer’s domicile, the consumer must be able to enjoy the protection available to 
him when he enters into a contract by electronic means from his domicile.84
The explanatory memorandum to the draft explained that it was intended to include 
contracts concluded via interactive websites accessible in the consumer’s state of 
domicile. However, passive websites that inform consumers about the possibility of 
goods and services would not be covered. In the latter instance, the consumer was to 
be treated as the active party who seeks out the site; just as she might travel to a 
foreign market or shopping mall. But the wording has been omitted from the final 
Instrument.  
The Council and the Commission have issued a Joint Declaration on the interpretation 
of the phrase ‘directs activities to’.85  In this Declaration it is suggested that it is not 
sufficient merely for activities to be targeted at a Member State of a consumers 
residence but that in addition, any contract must be concluded within that framework.  
The mere fact that a site is accessible is not enough.  However, a factor to be taken 
into account is that the Internet site solicits the conclusion of distance contracts and 
that a contract has actually been concluded by whatever means.  The statement goes 
on to suggest that in this respect the language or currency does not constitute a 
relevant factor.  The utility of the advice given in this declaration is open to debate. 
                                                
82 .  See generally ‘Hearing on electronic commerce Jurisdiction and applicable law 4-5 November 
1999. Position papers submitted to the European Commission’.  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/scic/conferences/991104/contributions.pdf
83 COM (1999) 348.
84 Recital 13
85 The Brussels Regulation:  The Council and Commission’s Joint Statement on Articles 15 and 73.  
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/guide/jurisdiction_eustate.htm.  Unfortunately the statement is 
undated.  
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Indeed, it appears to be questioned by the DTI who, in their own guidance available 
on their website have said that where a site is based in England, where prices are 
expressed in sterling and which confines orders to UK customers might be hard to 
describe as directed at anywhere but the UK.86  Admittedly the final decision will be 
for the ECJ when eventually called upon to adjudicate this matter, but the public 
disagreement between these regulatory bodies can do little to increase the levels of 
confidence of either suppliers or consumers – something desperately needed if B2C e-
commerce is to flourish.  
Further comment has been made on the opaque nature of the test in the Green Paper 
proposing amendments to the Rome Convention where it is said that the opportunity 
might be taken during that review to reflect upon the meaning of the phrase ‘directs 
activities to’.  This would be particularly welcome if it is decided to amend the text of 
the Rome Convention to bring it into line with that chosen for the Brussels Regulation 
so that both instruments refer to the test of ‘directs activities to’.87  
Zoning
So what is the position in relation to applicable law and jurisdiction for consumer 
contracts on the Internet?  The broad answer is that if a supplier sends a specific 
invitation or ‘advertises’ his wares on the Internet, and the activities of the supplier 
are directed to the consumer, then jurisdiction will be at the consumers domicile, and 
the mandatory consumer protection rules of the consumer’s habitual residence will 
apply.  The devil, however, is in the detail.
Although, as discussed above, the Commission appears to think that disclaimers will 
not be effective to ring-fence consumer contracts, if the test for interpreting both 
‘advertises’ and ‘directs activities to’ is an objective one, then the inclusion of a 
                                                
86 http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/guide/jurisdiction_brussels.htm
87 Problems of determining jurisdiction have also arisen where a tort or delict is committed in one 
jurisdiction but its effects are felt in many others.  In an attempt to limit the number of possible fora 
commentators have suggested a variety of tests including that the website should ‘target’ a particular 
forum, that the ‘effects’ of the activity are felt in a particular forum, or that a ‘single publication rule’ 
should be introduced designating the (but only one) most appropriate forum in which a case should be 
heard.  For further details see Edwards (2004) The Scotsman, the Greek, the Mauritian company and 
the Internet:  Where on Earth Do Things Happen in Cyberspace? 8 Edinburgh Law Review 99-111, 
W Green, Edinburgh.
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disclaimer on a site must be a relevant factor in any analysis by a court.  However, the 
use of such disclaimers will certainly encourage ‘zoning’ of the Internet.  In other 
words, far from being a borderless world, application of the rules encourages 
suppliers to delimit those jurisdictions in which they are prepared to do business and 
thus contain the numbers of laws that may be applicable to their transactions.  
The US case of  Euromarket Designs Inc. v Crate & Barrel88 is one example of an 
attempt at zoning.  A website run by Crate & Barrel from Ireland said ‘Goods only 
sold in the Republic of Ireland’ a clear attempt to limit the territorial applicability of 
the site.  But unfortunately, at least for Crate & Barrel, the way the site was set up was 
not consistent with this statement as users were able ‘to select the United States as 
part of both their shipping and billing addresses, the fields in which users entered 
their… addresses were organised for a United States format address, ie., city, state, 
zip code, and there was evidence that the company sold to at least one person in the 
forum state through its website.’ 89  An objective analysis indicated a ‘mixed 
message’.  
Zoning is also encouraged by some regulatory authorities. In Australia a policy 
statement by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) relating to 
online offers of securities states90:
‘[I]n order not to target persons in Australia… the offeror must… take a variety of 
precautions designed to exclude subscriptions being accepted from persons in 
Australia and to check that the precautions are effective… Examples of precautions 
are not sending notices to, or not accepting applications from, persons whose 
telephone numbers, postal or electronic addresses or other particulars indicate that 
they are applying from Australia… It is not acceptable to only use precautions that 
place the responsibility on the applicant.  For example, it is not enough to simply ask 
an applicant whether they are applying from Australia.’
                                                
88 96 F Supp 2d 824 (ND III 2000).
89 Smith Internet Law and Regulation Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2002.
90 Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) Offers of Securities on the Internet.  
Policy Statement 141 (10 February 1999, reissued 2 March 2000) PS 141.14 at 
www.cpd.com.au/asic/ps
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The purpose here is to advise offshore financial operators as to what they must do in 
order not to be subject to Australian jurisdiction and laws.
As consumer protection laws become harmonised throughout Europe, will this zoning 
activity remain necessary?  In other words, as consumer protection laws converge so 
the risk to the trader should lessen.  The trader should be aware of the laws that are 
relevant in a transaction with a consumer.  Certainly the trader could still face the risk 
of being hailed into court in the jurisdiction of the consumer, but the risk of unknown 
or unknowable laws should be significantly reduced.  Therefore a trader should be 
free to supply consumers throughout Europe knowing the risk he faces.  
Such an idea might sound good in theory, but in practice it is likely to be many years 
before the necessary level of harmonisation is attained.91  Many of the consumer 
protection measures are minimum rather than absolute requirements.  The period of 
notice for cancellation of a consumer contract is a case in point.92  Further, different 
national courts will interpret requirements subject to their own rules.  The ECJ may be 
final arbiter in those areas in which it has competence, but it is unlikely that every 
potential conflict will be raised before that court for adjudication within the 
foreseeable future.
The smooth path to the Single European Market:  alternative routes
Does it all matter anyway?  The rules are complex and litigation is likely to be much 
too expensive for a consumer, particularly when compared to what maybe a 
transaction of (relatively) small value.  The consumer might be much better placed to 
consider other protective mechanisms.  
One avenue might be through a careful choice of method of payment.  When 
concluding a transaction on-line, a consumer may be faced with a number of options, 
the most common being payment by way of credit or debit card.93  If a consumer 
                                                
91 See the example given on p29 fn 58 of the Green Paper.  
92 Directive 97/7/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts Article 6.1 Right of Withdrawal ‘For any 
distance contract the consumer shall have a period of at least seven working days in which to withdraw 
from the contract without penalty and without giving any reason’. [emphasis added].
93 A variety of other options may also be available including PayPal.  For information see 
http://www.paypal.com/
28
chooses to pay by credit card then some comfort may be found in the UK by virtue of 
Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.  Subject to a number of requirements94
Section 75 of that Act provides that the bank (or other credit grantor) is equally 
responsible with the supplier for any breach of contract or misrepresentation.  This 
means that the consumer can choose to sue either the bank or the supplier.  It had 
always been unclear as to whether section 75 applied to purchases made abroad, for 
instance over the Internet.  Anecdotal evidence from Trading Standards Officers 
would suggest that they have successfully assisted consumers in seeking redress from 
a bank where a purchase has been made from foreign parts.  Further, three banks, 
HSBC, Bank of Scotland and Sainsbury’s Bank, have publicly confirmed that they 
would not differentiate between claims based on where a purchase was made.95  In 
other words, they will extend the protection to purchases made overseas.  However, 
this question on liability has now been referred to the High Court in a test case 
brought by the Office of Fair Trading against a number of banks.  The OFT lost, with 
the court ruling that purchases made overseas were not so protected.96  Whether the 
banks mentioned above will now change their approach to consumers remains to be 
seen.
All of which begs the question as to how many people actually do shop on-line in any 
event, and which of those make purchases from other European countries?  In 
November 2002 a Eurobarometer survey asked a number of questions of consumers 
about their attitudes to cross border shopping.97  Here are some of the questions and 
the responses:
One in eight Europeans had bought or ordered products or services for private use 
from shops or sellers located in another EU country during the last 12 months.  Of 
                                                
94 The cash price of the item being supplied is over £100 but not more than £30,000; 2.  The credit 
agreement is regulated; 3. The credit grantor is in the business of granting credit and the credit 
agreement is made in the course of that business; 4. The credit is advanced under arrangements 
between the credit grantor and the supplier.
95 http://www.oft.gov.uk/News/Press+releases/2002/PN+60-
02+Protection+for+credit+card+holders+when+they+shop+abroad.htm
96 The Office of Fair Trading v. Lloyds TSB Bank plc, Tesco Personal Finance Limited, American 
Express Services Europe Limited.  Case No 2003 Folio No 687.  QBD (Comm) 12 November 2004.
97 Standard Eurobarometer 57.2; Flash Eurobarometer 128; Press and Communication Directorate-




those 57% did so when abroad on holiday, 34% when on a trip for shopping and only 
18% on the Internet
Reasons given for lack of confidence:
 It is harder to resolve after-sales problems such as complaints, returns and 
refunds and guarantees 59%
 It is harder to ask public authorities or consumer associations to intervene on 
my behalf 47% 
 A greater risk of practical problems e.g. Delivery hold-ups, errors etc. 44%
 I don’t know the consumer protection laws in other EU countries 43%
 I can’t trust foreign shops or sellers – there is a greater risk of fraud or 
deception 36%
 I can’t trust the safety of goods and services purchased from foreign shops or 
sellers 34%
 The lower standards of consumer protection laws in other EU countries 32%
 It is harder to take legal action through the courts 51%
When asked about measures to increase confidence in cross border purchases 
consumer views were as follows:
 Strengthening consumer protection laws in all EU countries 80% fairly 
important
 Harmonisation of consumer protection laws 79% fairly important
 If national authorities could intervene on your behalf in other EU countries 
43% fairly important.
However and notably, 57% would not buy more even if they were equally confident 
about making purchases from shops or sellers located in another EU country.  Only 
19% would buy a little more and only 4% would buy a lot more.98
                                                
98 For an interesting survey carried out by the European Consumer Centres on ‘Realities of the 
European Marketplace:  A cross-border e-commerce project by the European Consumer Centre’s 
Network’ see http://www.konsumenteuropa.se/Documents/Engelska/EEC_e-commerce_report.pdf.  
See also the speech made by David Byrne, (Speech/04/130) European Commissioner for Health and 
Consumer Protection, ‘Consumer Confidence in the Online Marketplace Boosting Competitiveness’ at 




It seems there is a room for a vigorous education campaign.  It is also interesting to 
reflect on my own attitude to Internet shopping as a reasonably well-travelled and 
frequent user of the Internet.  I do purchase on-line from other European countries 
(and further afield).  Any decision I make on whether to purchase from a particular 
supplier is based on my personal knowledge through having shopped there before 
(brand value and reputation) or on personal recommendation.  If I purchase from an 
unknown supplier (my Sancerre) I will always make a small purchase first and see if 
it works.  If all goes smoothly I might increase the size of future purchases.  I will 
always use my credit card sometimes suffering the indignity of having to pay a 
premium for the privilege.  Have I had any problems?  No, never.  One member of my 
family did have a problem with a computer – there was a failure to return the machine 
after a breakdown had been fixed shortly after it had been purchased. It had been 
‘lost’ somewhere in the warehouse.   Sadly he had not purchased the machine with his 
credit card.  The supplier was threatened with all sorts of doom laden scenarios 
including being set upon by Trading Standards Officers as the website did not comply 
with the Distance Selling Regulations.  Eventually, but belatedly, the computer was 
returned.  Will my nearest and dearest ever use that store again?  No.  Will I, or 
indeed anyone else to whom I relate this story?  No.  If I compare this process with 
my ‘real-time’ shopping habits there are differences.  I do exercise a higher degree of 
caution when making purchases on the Internet from abroad.  I am more willing to 
take the risk of failure upon myself but take steps to manage the size of that risk.  But 
the underlying message from the consumer to the trader is the same.  Be honest.  Be 
upfront.  You will have nothing to worry about.  Except, of course, the rogue 
consumer.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that there has been an active programme in place in 
Europe for many years now, the purpose of which is to try and avoid disputes between 
suppliers and consumers, and if disputes do arise then the intention is to provide a 
mechanism whereby these can be settled out of court sometimes through on-line 
dispute resolution.99  Further, agreements between regulatory bodies in the EU (such 
as trading standards officers) have been put into place to assist consumers and 
                                                
99 For full details visit the European Commission Consumer Affairs website at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/index_en.htm
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maintain an oversight in relation to on-line B2C trading activity.100  In reality it is this 
framework, if both sufficiently resourced and known about by consumers,  that is 
likely to provide the most realistic mechanism for redress in the event that something 
goes wrong and in turn provide the means by which sufficient confidence can be 
engendered in the system to encourage consumers to engage in purchasing on-line and 
suppliers to reach out to consumers in the whole of the EU.  
Conclusion
If there is a smooth path to the Single European Market through the creation of rules 
relating to choice of applicable law and jurisdiction for consumer purchases made on-
line, it has yet to be completed.  That so many different interests have to be 
accommodated within the framework, including public and private interests, those of 
the consumer and the supplier, not to mention the historical traditions and theoretical 
underpinnings of each of the Member States of the EU in the areas of consumer 
protection and international private law, inevitably means that there is no easy 
solution to the risks posed by B2C e-commerce.  There will always be a trade-off 
between certainty through the application of hard and fast rules, and the need for 
flexibility so that a court can do justice when faced with a particular dispute.  Whether 
an equilibrium between these ideals has yet been attained is open to debate.  
                                                
100 See EC Green Paper on Consumer Protection Memo 01/307 at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press191_en.pdf
